North Dakota Law Review
Volume 33

Number 1

Article 12

1957

Real Property - Joint Tenancy - Right of Survivor Who Feloniously
Kills Cotenant
Paul Pfeilsticker

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Pfeilsticker, Paul (1957) "Real Property - Joint Tenancy - Right of Survivor Who Feloniously Kills Cotenant,"
North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 33 : No. 1 , Article 12.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol33/iss1/12

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons.
For more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu.

118

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL.

33

equitable jurisdiction should not be determined solely on the basis of a rule
of construction but rather on the merits of the case in the light of judicial
precedent.13
JOHN MICHAEL NILLES.

REAL PROPERTY -

JOINT TENANCY -

RIGHT OF SURVIVOR WHO FELONIOUSLY

KILLS COTENANT. - The heirs of deceased joint tenant brought an action to
impose a constructive trust on one-half of the property held by defendant as
surviving joint tenant where the defendant while insane killed his co-tenant.
It was held that insanity of the killer constitutes an exception to the general
rule in Minnesota which imposes a constructive trust on property so obtained,
and where insanity is established, the general principals of survivorship apply.'
No constructive trust will be imposed, the insane killer taking the fee simple
free of all trusts as the surviving joint tenant. Anderson "v.Grasberg, 78
N.W.2d 450 (Minn. 1956).
The problem of the killer benefiting from his own wrong has been before
4
3
2
the courts in relation to reversions, remainders, individual life insurance,
6
8
insurance on joint lives,5 community property, dower7 and succession, as
well as joint tenancy and tenancy by the entireties.0 In dealing with this situation, four theories have been advanced: certain courts apply only the equitable
doctrine which prohibits a wrongdoer from profiting by his wrongful act, and
thereby divest the killer of all jointly held property; 10 some courts completely
ignore the equities and apply survivorship concepts to allow the slayer to take
the fee to the jointly held property;-1 other courts applying the third and
fourth theories seem to give equal weight to the equities and survivorship

13. Note, 37 Iowa L. Rev. 268 (1952).
1. For allowing the defense of insanity, the court is supported by Eisenhardt v. Seigal,
343 Mo. 22, 119 S.W.2d 810 (1938).
2. Eisenhardt v. Seigal, supra note 1 (Victim held property on condition that it should
revert if the victim predecease the murderer).
3. Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 111.
180, 106 N.E. 785 (1914); In re Emerson's Estate,
191 Iowa 900, 183 N.W. 327 (1921); Blanks v. Jiggetts, 192 Va. 337, 64 S.E.2d 809
(1951).
4. New York Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591 (1886).
See also
Vance, Insurance J 117 (3d ed. 1951); Grossman, Liability and Rights of the Insurer
When the Death of the Insured Is Caused by the Beneficiary or an Assigns, 10 B. U. L.

Rev. 281 (1930).
5. Spicer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 268 Fed. 500 (5th Cir. 1920) cert. denied,
255 U. S. 572 (1921); Merrity v. Prudential Ins. Co., 110 N. J. L. 414, 166 At. 335
(1933).
6. Hill v. Noland, 149 S.W. 288 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
7. Barnes v. Cooper, 204 Ark. 118, 161 S.W.2d 8 (1942); Owens v. Owens, 100
N. C. 240, 6 S.E. 794 (1888).
8. Atkinson, Wills 6 37 (2d ed. 1953); Restatement, Restitution 1 187 (1937);
Note, 29 Mich. L. Rev. 745, 746 (1931). Several states including North Dakota have a
statute prohibiting the murderer from taking under a will of his victim. N. D. Rev. Code
J 56-0423 (1943).
9. Although joint tenancy and tenancy by the entireties differ in certain respects, such
as the methods by which they can be terminated, the courts generally treat the two types
of estate in the same manner in relation to the present problem. In re Santourian's Estate,

125 Misc. 668., 212 N. Y. Supp. 116 (Surr. Ct. 1925) (joint tenancy in a bank account);
Van Alystyne v. Tuffy, 103 Misc. 455, 169 N. Y. Supp. 173 (Sup. Ct. 1918) (Tenancy by
the entireties).

10. In re Santourian's Estate, supra note 9 ("[II am opposed to . . . any doctrine of
law which offers a premium to husbands to kill their wives.")
11. Smith v. Greenberg. 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950).
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theory and either inpose a constructive trust or declare a severance of the
2
Itnancy.'
The rule which divests an assassin of all his interest in joint property is
based solely upon the equitable doctrine and is applied by only one jurisdiction.'2 The completely opposite extreme is more popular, several states having
allowed the slayer to take the entire interest. 14 he proponents of this rule
contend that the property interest became vested in the joint tenants by the
original contract or conveyance and that the survivor gained nothing from
the cotenant's death that he did not previously have.' 5 Certain writers critize
this reasoning as medieval logic, over-emphasizing the fiction of survivorship
and disregarding equitable considerations.,6
Other courts, recognizing the practical, if not legal, benefit accruing to the
self-made-survivor, when the courts of equity do not intervene,17 have attcmpted to take a middle ground by the use of constructi ,e trusts.' 8 These
courts vest the title to the property in the slayer, who holds all or a portion
of the property in trust for the heirs of the victim. In theory the imposition
of a constructive trust does not constitute a forfeiture.19 However a forfeiture
has in fact resulted since he no longer has a right to the benefits accruing
from the property.
The fourth rule is the tenancy-in-common theory. The courts following this
rule conclude that the killing of one joint tenant by the other terminates the
right of survivorship, and the heirs of the deceased joint tenant are entitled
to an undivided one-half interest as tenants in common with the surviving
tenant. 20 This view appears to avoid the forfeiture problem since it is universally recognized that one tenant can sever the joint tenancy, transforming
the relationship into one of tenancy-in-common by an act disharmonious with
the joint tenancy relationship.2
It seems universal that succession statutes forbidding a slayer from succeed-

12. Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385 (1952) (imposition of a constructive trust); Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699 (III. 1956) (declaration of a tenancyin-common).

13. In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. 668, 212 N. Y. Supp. 116 (1925); Beribrauer

v. Moran, 244 App. Div. 87, 279 N. Y. Supp. 176 (1935).

14. Smith v. Greenberg, 121 Colo. 417, 218 P.2d 514 (1950); National City Bank v.
Bledsoe, 133 N.E.2d 887 (Ind. 1956); Oleff v. Hodapp, 129 Ohio St. 432, 195 N.E. 838
(1935); Wenker v. Landon, 161 Ore. 265, 88 P.2d 971 (1939); Beddington v. Estill &
Newman, 118 Tenn. 39, 100 S.W. 108 (1907). While Illinois, in Walsh v. James, 408
III. 18, 95 N.E.2d 872 (1950), also subscribed to this doctrine, that case is now overruled
and the court has chosen to declare a severance. See Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699
(III. 1956).

15. Oleff v. Hodapp, supra note 14 at 841, ("[P]roperty rights are too sacred to be
subjected to such an attack. We experience no satisfaction in our holding, but that is
the law and we must so hold.")

16. 3 Bogart, Trusts, and Trustees § 478 (2d ed. 1946).
17. Colton v. Wade, 32 Del. Ch. .122, 80 A.2d 923 (1951); Sherman v. Weber, 113

N.J.Eq. 451, 167 Atl. 517 (1933).
18. Colton v. Wade, supra note 17; Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295, 54 N.W.2d 385

(1952); Bryant v. Bryant, 193 N. C. 372, 137 S.E. 188 (1927); Sherman v. Weber,
supra note 17.
19. See Ellerson v. Wescott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N.E. 540 (1891); Bryant v. Bryant,
supra note 18.
20. Ashwod v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d
699 (Il1. 1956); Grose v. Holland, 357 Mo. 834, 211 S.W.2d 464 (1948); Barnett v.
Couey, 224 Mo. App. 913, 27 S.W.2d 757 (1930).
21. In re Heckman's Estate, 228 Iowa 967, 291 N.W. 465 (1940); Fleming v.
Fleming, 194 Iowa 71, 174 N.W. 946 (1920); See Tiffany, Real Property 5 425 (3d
vd. 1939).
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ing to the property of his victim are inapplicable.
I lowever the absence of
a statute expressly applicable23 does not seem to be sufficient reason for
4
allowing the slayer to take the entire estate in view of the contrary equities.2
It appears that the solution to the problem lies in legislation.25 But the
legislature in North Dakota has not, as yet, felt the need for such pronouncements and it is still a question whether adequate language can be devised to
meet the peculiar sets of facts likely to arise. 2' One of the relevant problems
presented to the legislature in this situation would he the state of the record
title and its effect on the abstracting profession.'
The North Dakota courts
have not been faced with the problem, and are free to follow any of the four
lines of authorities without being bound by statute or precedent.
The better view appears to be the tenancy-in-common theory. This rule
presents not only the most equitable, but also the most legally jutiflable result.
Under such a result the problem of forfeiture is avoided and the strong public
policy against the assassin is well satisfied.28
PAUL

REAL PROPERTY - OIL

PFEILSTICKEIR.

- EFFECT OF TAX SALE ON PREVIOUSLY
In an action to quiet title to minerals, it appeared that the owner of certain lands in 1924 conveyed the surface to Odental, reserving all mineral rights; this deed was recorded. In 1932 the county
took title for nonpayment of taxes, and in the same year conveyed the premises
to McLain by tax deed, reciting the government description. McLain then conveyed to the defendant by warranty deed. In 1936 Odenthal's surface grantor
quitclaimed the reserved mineral rights to Odenthal, who in 1954 conveyed
these rights to plaintiffs by deed which was recorded one month prior to commencement of this suit. In affirming the trial court's decree for plaintiffs the
court held that where a tax deed is taken after a severance of mineral rights,
purporting to convey the government description without specifically including
the mineral interests, the county acquires tax title to the surface only. Bilby v.
Wire, 77 N.W.2d 882 (N. D. 1956).
Statutes in North Dakota, and most other jurisdictions, expressly provide
for severance of mineral rights, and their separate taxation., However, courts
disagree as to what interests are derived from purchase of tax deed when
mineral interests have been severed. This variation is due to procedural dif-

SEVERED MINERAL

AND

GAS

INTERESTS. -

22. Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1951); Vesey v. Vesey, 237 Minn. 295,
54 N.W.2d 385 (1952); But some courts rely unon such a statnte as an. indication of
public policy. See, Bradley v. Fox, 129 N.E.2d 699, 704 (Ill. 1955).
23. It appears that North Dakota has no express statute anplicable to joint tenants in
this problem. However, see N. D. Rev. Code § 56-0423 (1943) as applicable to wills
and succession.
24. See Atkinson, Wills 1 37 (2d ed. 1953); 3 Bogart, Trusts and Trustees 1 478
(2d ed. 1946); 3 Scott, Trusts 1 493.2 (1939).
25. For statutes covering the situation see Ky. Rev. Stat. § 381.280 (1955); Pa. Stat.
Ann. tit. 20, 1 3446 (Purdon's Snpp. 1950): S. D. Code § 58.0505 (1939); See Wade,
Acquisition of Property by Wilfully Killing AnotherA Statutory Solution, 49 Harv. L.
Rev. 715 (1935).
26. Wade, supra note 25.
27. A pertinent problem is whether the ahstractor must look beyond the fact of death
in a joint tenancy. situation. For one solution see Wade. vunro note 25 at 749.
28. Cardozo, Nature of the Judicial Process, 43 (1921)
("The social interest served
by refusing to permit the criminal to profit by his crime is greater than that served by
the presevation and enforcement of legal rights of ownership.")
W.

1. E.g., 18 Minn. Stat. Ann. i 272.04 (1945);
Va. Code Ann. § 715 (1949).

N. D. Rev. Code § 57-0224 (1943);

